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tion. But no potent force is operative to produce such a result, since state differences in the statement or application of choice of law rules no longer create
constitutional questions.30 The absence of a judicially developed uniform test
and the unlikelihood of uniform state or federal legislations' point to continued
inadequate treatment of these choice of law problems-a result particularly
unfortunate because of the growth of mass communication.

DEBT COLLECTION BY BOYCOTT AS A "LABOR DISPUTE"
The respondent, a delicatessen proprietor, found that the delivery of bread
from Hinkle's Bakery at the noon hour was inconvenient and "required"
Hinkle's truck driver to deliver at another hour. After Hinkle's Bakery informed the respondent that it would no longer supply her, she was able to
arrange a satisfactory hour of delivery with another bakery. Three weeks later
the business agent of the union representing Hinkle's drivers appeared at the
delicatessen and demanded immediate payment of $150 purportedly due the
driver. He also demanded that the respondent stop selling a non-union made
item which she had been carrying, and stated that the union would prevent all
shipments of bakery, milk, and dairy products to her store from any source if
these demands were not satisfied. According to the respondent, she then discontinued sale of the non-union made item and made payment of the amount requested, by check, to the bakery. The check, which had been turned over to the
union business agent by the bakery, was returned with a letter saying that it
could not be accepted in settlement because "it was $12.22 short of the amount
which is owed to our member." The next day the respondent was informed by
her new supplier that no more deliveries could be made, since the union had
threatened to pull out all of its drivers if any more products were sold or delivered to the respondent. After a more extensive boycott had been established,
with pickets parading in front of the delicatessen store, a federal district court
granted the respondent's petition for an injunction pendente lite restraining
both boycotting and picketing by the union. Upon appeal of the single question of whether the case involved a labor dispute under the terms of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
lower court's decision that no labor dispute existed.' On certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed, three justices dissenting. Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No.
33 V. Wagshal.2
The Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, examined the three incidents corn30 O'Meara, Constitutional Aspects of the Conflict of Laws: Recent Developments, 27
Minn. L. Rev. 5oo (I943).
31 The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation and Invasion of Privacy: An Unsolved
Problem, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 941, 951 (1947).
z Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 16i F. 2d 38o (App. D.C., 1947).
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prising the union's claim that a labor dispute existed. The controversy over the
hour of delivery was characterized as "dead" and as "not involved in the subsequent dispute with the union, or in the boycott against which the injunction
was issued." The disagreement over the bill was said to be a "business controversy" since, on the basis of uncontroverted allegations, the driver would
receive his pay whether or not the respondent paid her bill, and, therefore, there
was no dispute concerning "a condition of his employment." In accordance with
the affidavit attached to the "answer to the motion to dismiss," which served
as an allegation rather than proof, and which was not denied by the petitioner,
the Court described the sale of the non-union made item as "not a bona fide
bone of contention, but a mere pretext"'3 and concluded that the boycott was
addressed only to the question of the payment of the bill. As a result, it was
held that no labor dispute existed and, therefore, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
could not apply. Consequently, the Court held that the order for the injunction
was not appealable. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy dissented without
opinion. Presumably, a strong dissent could be built on the view that, despite
the unique facts of the case, the majority opinion cuts unnecessarily and perhaps dangerously into the protective mantle of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This
view was expressed by Judge Edgerton, dissenting in the Court of Appeals
decision.4
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals contained an extensive discussion of the legitimacy of the union's objectives and the necessity of balancing
the conflicting interests involved which, combined with the nature of the
Supreme Court's affirmance, place upon the case the imprint of the "illegal
purpose" doctrine. That the existence of a labor dispute under Section 13 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act s should depend upon a court's conception of a "bona
fide labor controversy, founded upon issues involving the protection of labor in
pursuing its legitimate objectives ' 6 is surprising in view of the cases denying
injunctive relief where the dispute in question was prompted by such motives
as revenge, 7 compelling payment of a "sticker fee" in violation of the Sherman
Act, 8 and securing employment of Negroes. 9
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals appeared to base their
holdings largely on the ground that the respondent had never directly paid the
3 Ibid., at 44o.
4 Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 16i F. 2d 380, 384 (App. D.C.,
1947).

547 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 113 (I947).
6 Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, i61 F. 2d 380, 383 (App. D.C.,
1947).
7 Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945) (damages and injunctive relief sought under the
Sherman Act).
8 Peterson v. Master Plumbers' Ass'n, 44 F. Supp. 908 (Nev., 1942).
9

New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
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wages of the driver and that what was involved was therefore a "business controversy." Although traditionally wages have been defined as compensation
paid to an employee by his employer, ° the reliance placed by both courts upon
the absence of any employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant seems misplaced, since Section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly eliminates the necessity for the existence of a proximate employment
relationship between the parties to a labor dispute.
That section was liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court in the New
Negro Alliance case," where it was held that a labor dispute existed despite the
facts that a non-labor organization sought an indirect benefit and that no question of wages, hours, or conditions of employment was involved. In the instant
case it could be said that the union had a direct pecuniary interest, since
Hinkle's customers were realistically the primary source of his driver's wages,
and in this sense Hinkle might be thought of as a mere conduit for the flow of
compensation from his customers to his drivers. Although the facts of the case
indicated that the driver would receive his pay whether or not the respondent
paid Hinkle, nonetheless Hinkle's collection of bills due him was a genuine
matter of economic concern to the union." It can likewise be said that the question of the hour of delivery concerned "terms or conditions of [the driver's]
employment." In addition, even if the sale of the non-union made item was not
a bona fide controversy, it was still a disputed point, so that it might be concluded, on that basis alone, that the case was one "involving or growing out of a
labor dispute."
However, it is not difficult to appreciate the position of the majority in both
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals decisions, for the whole amount
due could easily have been collected in a small claims court if a bona fide debt
existed. By choosing instead to exert the economic coercion of a boycott'3 to
collect a debt of $12.22 the union was merely flexing its muscles. Such a resort
to self-help was unnecessary, since an adequate remedy at law has always existed for the recovery of unpaid wages; indeed, the law grants the holder of such
10"[A] compensation given to a hired person for his or her services." Bouvier, Law Dictionary 3417 (1914). "[A]greed compensation for services rendered by the workmen, clerks, or
servants..., those who have served [an employer] in a subordinate or menial capacity ...."
In re Gurewitz, 121 Fed. 982, 983 (C.C.A. zd, i903).
xxNew Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
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Lichterman v. Laundry &Dry Cleaning Drivers Union Local No. 131, 204 Minn. 75,
N.W. 689 (1938), the court found that the union involved had a direct interest in prices

charged customers by, an employer, and injunctive relief was refused under Minnesota's
little Norris-LaGuardia Act.
13 The Court of Appeals pointed out that the "boycott... was successful in keeping appeliee from purchasing bread either from bakers or retail stores in Washington or surrounding
territory, even to the extent of a single loaf of bread." Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union
No. 33 v. Wagshal, 161 F. 2d 380, 381 (App. D.C., 1947). In addition to the injunctive relief
sought, the plaintiff asked for damages in the amount of $5oooo, along with an equal amount

of punitive damages.
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a claim high preference rating over other types of creditors.'4 The resort to selfhelp here, moreover, violates a basic premise of any system of jurisprudence,
since the existence of a bona fide debt is a fact properly determinable by a court,
not by the relative strength of the two parties.IS
The final decision is further strengthened if unions are considered on a par
with businessmen,,6 since trade associations have been restrained from exerting
combined pressure in the form of a concerted refusal to deal with an alleged
7
debtor of one of their members. The court in Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder,
denounced such an extra-legal mode of debt collection, emphasizing the potentiality for extortion inherent in such a sell-help measure. The same danger
may be present in a policy which would permit the union in the instant case to
enforce its claim with a boycott; the fact remains, however, that Congress has
8
expressed its intent to apply a contrary rule where labor activity is involved.,
Thus, even though the decision here protected the legitimate property interests
of the respondent9 while working little hardship to the union, it seems that the
narrow scope of equity power left to the courts by the Norris-LaGuardia Act"'
14 This policy is exemplified by the Bankruptcy Act and various state statutes such as the
one in Illinois reading "no personal property shall be exempt from levy of attachment or execution when the debt or judgment is for the wages of any laborer or servant. .. " Ill. Rev.
Stat. (x947) c. 52, § 16.
isIn Bowe v. Judson C. Burns, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 745 (Pa., 1942), it was heldthat an action
by employees, who were engaged in interstate commerce and who had worked overtime but
had not been paid the overtime rate required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, was not a
"labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The court distinguished a
situation concerning unpaid wages from one involving a controversy as to rates of pay on the
ground that in the former case the terms and conditions of employment were fixed and settled,
so that there could be no dispute concerning them. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 3o6 (1926).
x6 Gregory, Labor and the Law 19 (1946).
X798 Mo. App. 590, 71 S.W. 69i (I9O3); United States v. King, 250 Fed. 9o8 (D.C. Mass.,
1916) (semble); Swift & Co. v. United States, i96 U.S. 375 (x9o5) (semble). The rationale of

the contrary line of decisions, exemplified by Brewster v. Miller's Sons Co., ioi Ky. 368, 41
S.W. 3oi (1897), and McCarter v. Baltimore Chamber of Commerce, 126 Md. 131, 94 Atl.
541 (I915), is that such agreements do not constitute an offense at common law, since a person
has the right to enter into a business undertaking with anyone he chooses, free from any
legally imposed obligation to do otherwise. The Brewster case involved a situation of peculiar
hardship, since the association involved included all the undertakers in the alleged debtor's
community, all of whom refused to render the services necessary for the burial of his wife.
Yet the court held that even if the claim asserted had no foundation in either "morals or
law," if the members of the association chose to be influenced by it, the alleged debtor had no
cause of action against them.
28 Peterson v. Master Plumbers' Ass'n, 44 F. Supp. 9o8, 9ii (Nev., 1942).
'9 The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals upon the fact that the union activity
tended to "ruin a legitimate business over a difference of twelve dollars and twenty cents"
evokes speculation as to whether a contrary result would have been reached if the sum in
question had been larger. The characterizing of the relationship of the parties as "casual"
and the union's objective as "ridiculous" appears to be an attempt at justifying an erroneous
decision by an appeal to rhetoric.
20Section 13, by defining the allowable area of economic conflict, substituted a broader
conception of union economic interest for the narrow prevailing view of federal judges, both
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was exceeded. If injunctive relief had been withheld, the respondent could still
have sought damages in a subsequent action at law on the theory that the boycott had subjected her to unjustifiable tortious conduct.- Moreover, and perhaps most striking, the Supreme Court's opinion emphasized the letter rather
than the spirit of the Act." Although in the light of the facts presented the
decision creates little cause for sympathy with the union, the danger of a return
to a system of judicial settlement of labor disputes by injunction may be so real
as to militate against even the slightest inroads on the Act. 23

ILLINOIS TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS
The infant plaintiff was severely injured in a fall from the unguarded roof of
a wooden ticket office used as a part of the St. Philip Stadium, owned and operated by the Servite Fathers, an Illinois charitable corporation. The plaintiff sued
on the theory that the wooden roof was an attractive nuisance, easily accessible
to children and negligently maintained by the defendant in an unsafe condition.
The defendant pleaded that because of its eleemosynary character it could not
be held liable. Admitting the charitable character of the defendant corporation,
the plaintiff nevertheless asserted liability because, prior to the accident, the
Servite Fathers had procured a comprehensive general liability policy which
effectively protected its trust fund. Attached to this policy was a rider which,
in part, provided: "i. the company... will not use, either in the adjustment
of claims or in the defense of suits against the insured, the immunity of the insured from tort liability, unless requested by the insured to interpose such defense.", The trial court reasoned that the defendant was absolutely immune
from liability and that the indemnifying insurance did not create a liability
where none had previously existed. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed on the ground that the insurance policy created a separate fund, apart
from the trust fund of the charitable corporation, which could be used to compensate any person injured as a result of the negligence of the defendant.
Wendt v. Servite Fathers.2
at common law and under Section 20 of the Clayton Act. See Gregory, Labor and the Law
184-99 (1946).
21
Ibid., at 120-27.
= Report of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, S. Rep. 163, 72d Cong. ist Sess., at
(1932). "Section r3 of the bill defines various terms used in the act, and it is not believed
that any criticism has been or will be made to these definitions.... In order that the limitation may not be whittled away by refined definitions of what persons are to be regarded as
legitimately involved in labor disputes, the bill undertakes specifically to designate those persons who are entitled to invoke the protections...."
23See Watt, The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 409
25

('947).
x Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 620, 76 N.E. 2d 342, 343 (1947).
2332 III. App. 6z8, 76 N.E. 2d 342 (1947).

